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Abstract
A key issue in cooperative game theory is coalitional stability, usually captured by the
notion of the core—the set of outcomes that are resistant to group deviations. However,
some coalitional games have empty cores, and any outcome in such a game is unstable. We
investigate the possibility of stabilizing a coalitional game by using subsidies. We consider
scenarios where an external party that is interested in having the players work together
offers a supplemental payment to the grand coalition, or, more generally, a particular coali-
tion structure. This payment is conditional on players not deviating from this coalition
structure, and may be divided among the players in any way they wish. We define the
cost of stability as the minimum external payment that stabilizes the game. We provide
tight bounds on the cost of stability, both for games where the coalitional values are non-
negative (profit-sharing games) and for games where the coalitional values are nonpositive
(cost-sharing games), under natural assumptions on the characteristic function, such as
superadditivity, anonymity, or both. We also investigate the relationship between the cost
of stability and several variants of the least core. Finally, we study the computational
complexity of problems related to the cost of stability, with a focus on weighted voting
games.
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1. Introduction
There are many settings where self-interested agents find it profitable to cooperate and
form teams in order to achieve their individual goals: Workers with diverse skills might
want to found a start-up company; software agents can pool their resources to perform
large tasks; and firms can join databases they own in order to uncover new patterns. Such
settings are modeled using the toolkit of coalitional game theory, which studies what teams,
or coalitions, are most likely to arise and how their members should distribute the gains
from cooperation.
An important consideration in identifying acceptable outcomes of a coalitional game
is stability: The agents should prefer the current outcome to the ones they can feasibly
achieve by deviating. The most prominent solution concept that aims at formalizing the
idea of stability in coalitional games is the core: An outcome is said to be in the core if
it distributes the gains or costs so that no subset of agents has an incentive to abandon
the existing arrangement and form a coalition of their own. However, a coalitional game
may have an empty core. This observation has led to the development of several alternative
solution concepts, which are based on relaxing the core constraints (this includes the ε-
core, the least core, and the (pre)nucleolus (Shapley & Shubik, 1966; Schmeidler, 1969)) or
employing alternative notions of stability, such as the kernel and the bargaining set (Davis
& Maschler, 1965, 1967).
In this paper, we examine the possibility of stabilizing an outcome of a game by means
of subsidies. That is, we investigate settings where an external party, which can be seen
as a central authority interested in a stable outcome of the interaction, attempts to incen-
tivize the agents to cooperate. This party implements its agenda by offering the agents a
supplemental payment that is conditional on the agents working together as a team. This
payment is given to the grand coalition as a whole, and can be divided arbitrarily among
its members. We call the minimum payment necessary to stabilize the game the cost of
stability. It is useful both as a measure of the inherent instability of a given game (similarly
to the value of the least core), and as a design metric for an external party that considers
subsidizing the agents. It is convenient to distinguish between the minimum subsidy itself,
which we refer to as the additive cost of stability, and the ratio between the total payment
(the subsidy plus earnings) and the maximum amount that the agents can earn on their
own, which we call the multiplicative cost of stability, though of course the two quantities
are closely related.
The following example illustrates the concept of the cost of stability.
Example 1 (Sharing the cost) Three private hospitals in a large city plan to purchase
an X-ray machine. The standard X-ray machine costs $5 million, and can fulfill the needs
of up to two hospitals. There is also a more advanced machine, which is capable of serving
all three hospitals, but costs $9 million. The hospital managers understand that the right
thing to do is to buy the more expensive machine, which will serve all three hospitals and
cost less than two standard machines, but cannot agree on how to share the cost: There
will always be a pair of hospitals that (together) pay at least $6 million, and would then
rather split off and buy the cheaper machine for themselves. The generous mayor solves the
problem by subsidizing the advanced X-ray machine: She offers to contribute $3 million,
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and asks each hospital to add $2 million. Pairs of hospitals now have no incentive to buy
the cheaper machine, as each pair (together) only pays $4 million.
When the supplemental payment is large enough, the resulting outcome is stable: The
profit that the deviators can make on their own is dwarfed by the subsidy they could receive
by sticking to the prescribed solution. For instance, an easy way to stabilize the game above
would be for the mayor to pay for the advanced X-ray machine (a subsidy of $9 million in
total). However, normally the external party would want to minimize its expenditure: In
our example, a total subsidy of $1.5 million will suffice, thus the additive cost of stability
of the game in this example is $1.5 million.
The observation that an external party may be willing to subsidize the grand coalition
in the interest of stability has a long history; we provide an overview of this stream of work
in Section 7. However, most prior papers focus on analyzing the cost of stability (or its
variants) in specific combinatorial optimization games. In contrast, the goal of this paper is
to establish general bounds for classes of games that are characterized by simple axiomatic
conditions.
In Section 2, we present the required notions from cooperative game theory; for more
background, the reader is referred to the books by Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2003) and Chalki-
adakis, Elkind, and Wooldridge (2011) and to the book chapter by Elkind and Rothe (2015).
In Section 3, we introduce the notion of cost of stability and list some easy observations.
We then present our main contribution, which is twofold. First, we provide tight bounds on
the (multiplicative) cost of stability in games where the characteristic function satisfies ad-
ditional constraints, such as superadditivity, anonymity, or both (Section 4). These results
are summarized in Table 1 on page 28. Second, we explore the relationship between the
cost of stability and several variants of the least core (Section 5 and Table 2 on page 29).
Notably, some of our results rely on the tight connection between the cost of stability and
the Bondareva–Shapley theorem (see Section 3.2 for details), as well as on a characteri-
zation of the core of superadditive games due to Shapley (1967). In Section 6, we study
the algorithmic properties of problems related to the cost of stability in the context of a
specific compactly representable class of cooperative games, namely weighted voting games.
Related work is discussed in Section 7, and we conclude in Section 8 with a brief discussion
of future work.
2. Preliminaries
For brevity, we only provide formal definitions for games with positive values (where the
players share the profits of cooperation). The symmetric case where players share expenses,
or costs, is similar; we comment where special attention is required.
Given two vectors x = (x1, . . . , xn) and y = (y1, . . . , yn), we write x ≤ y if xi ≤ yi for
all i = 1, . . . , n. Also, given a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) and a set S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, we write
x(S) to denote
∑
i∈S xi.
A transferable utility game (TU game; note that we sometimes drop “TU”) is a pair
G = 〈N, v〉, where N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of n players (or agents) and v : 2N → R+ is
the characteristic function. By convention, v(∅) = 0 and v(N) > 0. Subsets of N are
called coalitions; the set N itself is called the grand coalition. A payoff vector for a TU
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game G = 〈N, v〉 is a vector p = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ Rn, where pi is the share of player i. A
payoff vector p is budget-balanced, or a pre-imputation, if
∑
i∈N pi = v(N). In general, we
do not impose any constraints on the signs of the entries of p. We denote by I(G) the set
of all pre-imputations for G. A pre-imputation p ∈ I(G) is said to be an imputation if it
is individually rational, i.e., pi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N . We say that a vector p ∈ Rn is
a super-imputation for a game G = 〈N, v〉 if pi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and p(N) ≥ v(N). A
coalition S blocks a payoff vector p if v(S) > p(S). A payoff vector is stable if no coalition
blocks it. We denote the set of all stable payoff vectors by S(G). The core of G, denoted
by C(G), is the set of all payoff vectors that are both stable and budget-balanced. Thus
C(G) = I(G) ∩ S(G).
A game G = 〈N, v〉 is called monotone if v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all coalitions S and T with
S ⊆ T ; it is called simple if it is monotone and v(S) ∈ {0, 1} for all S ⊆ N . Given a simple
game G = 〈N, v〉, we say that a coalition S ⊆ N wins if v(S) = 1, and it loses if v(S) = 0.
A player i in a simple game G = 〈N, v〉 is called a veto player if v(N \ {i}) = 0; it is known
that a simple game G has an empty core if and only if no player in this game is a veto
player (see, e.g., Peleg & Sudho¨lter, 2003). A game G = 〈N, v〉 is called superadditive if
v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ) for all S, T ⊆ N such that S ∩ T = ∅. (For cost-sharing games, the
analogous property is subadditivity, where the inequality is flipped.) A game G = 〈N, v〉
is called anonymous if the payoff of a coalition depends on its size only, i.e., v(S) = v(T )
whenever |S| = |T |. Given an anonymous game G = 〈N, v〉, for every k = 1, . . . , n we define
vk = v({1, . . . , k}); we have v(S) = vk for every coalition S ⊆ N of size k.
3. The Cost of Stability
In this section, we first define the notion of cost of stability and state some easy observations.
We then explore the relationship between the cost of stability and the Bondareva–Shapley
theorem.
3.1 Definition and Some Easy Observations
We consider settings where an external authority can provide a subsidy that increases
the value of the grand coalition. This subsidy is conditional on agents forming the grand
coalition, and can be divided arbitrarily among them. We will refer to the new game that
arises as a result of this subsidy as the adjusted coalitional game. Technically, this game is
derived from the original game by relaxing the budget-balance requirement.
Definition 1 Given a TU game G = 〈N, v〉 and a real value ∆ ≥ 0, the adjusted coalitional
game G(∆) = 〈N, v′〉 is given by
v′(S) =
{
v(S) if S 6= N
v(S) + ∆ if S = N.
We will refer to the quantity ∆ as the subsidy for the game G = 〈N, v〉. Note that a
super-imputation p with p(N) = v(N) + ∆ distributes the adjusted gains, i.e., it is a pre-
imputation for G(∆); it is stable if and only if it is in the core of G(∆). We say that a
subsidy ∆ stabilizes the game G if the adjusted game G(∆) has a nonempty core.
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Observe that every TU game can be stabilized by an appropriate choice of ∆: We can
set ∆ = nmaxS⊆N v(S) and distribute the profits so that each player receives at least
maxS⊆N v(S). However, the central authority typically wants to spend as little money as
possible. Hence, we are interested in the smallest subsidy that stabilizes the grand coalition.
Definition 2 Given a TU game G = 〈N, v〉, its additive cost of stability is the quantity
CoS+(G) = inf{∆ ∈ R+ | C(G(∆)) 6= ∅} = inf{p(N)− v(N) | p ∈ S(G)}, (1)
and its multiplicative cost of stability is the quantity
CoS×(G) =
CoS+(G) + v(N)
v(N)
= inf
{
p(N)
v(N)
∣∣∣ p ∈ S(G)} . (2)
In what follows, we will alternate between the additive and the multiplicative notation;
typically, results for the additive cost of stability can be restated for its multiplicative
sibling, and vice versa. Note that CoS×(G) ≥ 1.1
We will denote the game G(CoS+(G)) by G = 〈N, v〉. As argued above, the constraint
∆ ∈ R+ in (1) can be replaced with 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ nmaxS⊆N v(S). Since the inequalities defining
S(G) are not strict, S(G) is a closed set, so the infimum in (1) is in fact a minimum, and
thus G has a nonempty core.
To illustrate the notions introduced in this section, we provide two examples of analyzing
the cost of stability.
Our first example is weighted voting games where all players have the same weight.
Recall that a weighted voting game (WVG) is a simple game given by a set of agents
N = {1, . . . , n}, a vector of agents’ weights w = (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ (R+)n, and a quota q ∈ R+;
we write G = [w; q], or, dropping the vector parentheses, G = [w1, . . . , wn; q]. The weight
of a coalition S ⊆ N is w(S) = ∑i∈S wi; we require 0 < q ≤ w(N). A coalition S wins if
w(S) ≥ q and loses otherwise. For weighted voting games with wi = w for all i ∈ N we can
give an explicit formula for the cost of stability.
Proposition 1 In a weighted voting game G = [w,w, . . . , w; q] with n players, we have
CoS×(G) =
n
dq/we .
Equivalently, CoS+(G) = ndq/we − 1.
Proof. By scaling w and q we can assume that w = 1. Set ∆ = n/dqe− 1 and note that
since q ≤ nw, ∆ ≥ 0.
Consider the payoff vector p = (p1, . . . , pn) given by pi = 1/dqe for i = 1, . . . , n. Clearly,
we have p(N) = n/dqe, so p ∈ I(G(∆)). Moreover, for every winning coalition S we have
|S| ≥ dqe, so p(S) ≥ dqe · 1/dqe = 1. Therefore, p is in the core of G(∆), and hence
CoS+(G) ≤ ∆.
1For cost-sharing games, the multiplicative cost of stability is also known as the cost recovery ratio (Xu
& Du, 2006), and we have 0 ≤ CoS×(G) ≤ 1.
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Conversely, let p be in the core of G. Set s = dqe. Consider a collection of coalitions
S1, . . . , Sn, where Si = {(i mod n) + 1, (i + 1 mod n) + 1, . . . , (i + s − 1 mod n) + 1}; for
example, we have Sn−1 = {n, 1, . . . , s− 2, s− 1}. We have |Si| = s and hence p(Si) ≥ 1 for
all i = 1, . . . , n, so p(S1)+· · ·+p(Sn) ≥ n. On the other hand, each player i occurs in exactly
s of these coalitions, so we have p(N) ·s = p(S1)+ · · ·+p(Sn). Hence, p(N) ≥ n/s = n/dqe,
and therefore CoS+(G) ≥ ∆, and our claim follows. q
Our second example is given by simple games defined by finite projective planes; subse-
quently, we will use this example to prove lower bounds on the cost of stability.
Recall that the finite projective plane of order q, where q is a prime, has q2 +q+1 points
and the same number of lines; every line contains q + 1 points, every two lines intersect
at a single point, and every point belongs to exactly q + 1 lines. Given a finite projective
plane P of order q, we construct a simple game Gq = 〈N, v〉 as follows. We let N be the
set of points in P , and for every S ⊆ N , we let v(S) = 1 if S contains a line, and v(S) = 0
otherwise. Observe that this game is superadditive: Since any two lines intersect, there do
not exist two disjoint winning coalitions. The following proposition provides bounds on the
cost of stability in such games.
Proposition 2 We have CoS×(Gq) = q + 1q+1 ∈ (
√
n− 1,√n).
Proof. Consider a stable payoff vector p. For each line R we have p(R) ≥ 1. Summing
over all q2 + q+ 1 lines, and using the fact that each point belongs to q+ 1 lines, we obtain
(q + 1)
∑
i∈N pi ≥ q2 + q + 1, i.e.,
p(N) ≥ q
2 + q + 1
q + 1
= q +
1
q + 1
>
√
n− 1,
where the last inequality holds since n = |N | = q2 +q+1. On the other hand, it is clear that
the payoff vector p with pi =
1
q+1 for each i ∈ N is stable and p(N) = q + 1q+1 <
√
n. q
To conclude this section, we note that the cost of stability is essentially independent of
the utility scales, as shown by the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Given a game G = 〈N, v〉 and a positive real α, let αG be the game 〈N, v′〉,
where v′(S) = αv(S) for all S ⊆ N . Then CoS+(αG) = αCoS+(G), CoS×(αG) = CoS×(G).
Proof. Let ∆ = CoS+(G). Consider a payoff vector p ∈ C(G(∆)). The payoff vector αp
satisfies αp(S) ≥ αv(S) = v′(S) and αp(N) = v′(N) +α∆, which means that CoS+(αG) ≤
αCoS+(G). Conversely, by observing that G = 1α ·αG and applying the same argument, we
obtain CoS+(G) ≤ 1αCoS+(αG) and hence CoS+(αG) = αCoS+(G). It then follows that
CoS×(αG) = CoS×(G). q
On the other hand, adding a constant to the value of each coalition may change the cost
of stability in a hard-to-predict way. For instance, consider the two-player game G = 〈N, v〉,
where v({1}) = v({2}) = 0 and v({1, 2}) = 1. Every pre-imputation that allocates each
agent a nonnegative payoff is stable. Consequently, CoS+(G) = 0. If we increase the value
of every coalition by 1, i.e., set v′ = v + 1, the resulting game G′ = 〈N, v′〉 still has a
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nonempty core (as witnessed by the payoff vector p1 = p2 = 1) and hence CoS
+(G′) = 0.
However, if we increase the value of every coalition by 2, i.e., set v′′ = v + 2, any stable
payoff vector for the resulting game G′′ = 〈N, v′′〉 would have to satisfy p1 ≥ 2, p2 ≥ 2, so
p(N)− v′′(N) ≥ 1 and hence CoS+(G′′) ≥ 1.
3.2 The Cost of Stability and Balanced Collections of Weights
It is well-known that the core of a game G = 〈N, v〉 is the set of solutions to a linear
feasibility program with n variables p1, . . . , pn, whose constraints are p(S) ≥ v(S) for all
S ⊆ N , and p(N) = v(N). Replacing the constraint p(N) = v(N) with the optimization
goal min p(N) − v(N) (while keeping the constraint p(N) ≥ v(N)), we obtain a linear
optimization program, which we call LPG; it is immediate that the optimal value of this
linear program is exactly CoS+(G).
The dual linear program to LPG has a variable δS for every subset S ⊆ N , and n
“balance” constraints. We will now explain how to use this dual LP to obtain a closed-form
expression for the cost of stability.
Definition 3 A vector B = {δS}S∈2N is said to be a balanced collection of weights if
δS ∈ R+ for every S ∈ 2N , and for every agent i ∈ N it holds that
∑
S∈2N :i∈S δS = 1.
Given a balanced collection of weights B = {δS}S∈2N , define D(B) = {S ∈ 2N | δS > 0}; we
say that D(B) is the balanced collection of subsets associated with B. The following classic
result is a direct application of the LP duality theorem.
Theorem 4 (Bondareva (1963), Shapley (1967)) A game G = 〈N, v〉 has a nonempty
core if and only if for every balanced collection of weights {δS}S∈2N it holds that∑
S∈2N
δSv(S) ≤ v(N).
Now, fix a TU game G = 〈N, v〉 with an empty core and consider the associated game
G = 〈N, v〉. Since the core of G is empty, the constraint p(N) ≥ v(N) in LPG is redundant.
Removing this constraint corresponds to setting δN = 0 in the dual LP; the value of the
modified dual LP is the same as that of the original dual LP for LPG. Hence, G admits
a balanced collection of weights {δS}S∈2N with δN = 0 for which the inequality in the
statement of the Bondareva–Shapley theorem holds with equality, i.e.,
∑
S∈2N δSv(S) =
v(N) + CoS+(G) = v(N) · CoS×(G). As v(S) = v(S) for S 6= N , we can write the
multiplicative cost of stability of the game G as follows:
CoS×(G) =
1
v(N)
max
∑
S∈2N
δSv(S)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ {δS}S∈2N is balanced
 . (3)
Note that a balanced collection of weights {δS}S∈2N is a feasible solution of the linear
program that is dual to LPG. This inspires the following definition.
Definition 4 A solution to G is a balanced collection of weights {δS}S∈2N that satisfies∑
S∈2N δSv(S) = v(N) (note that v(N) = v(N) · CoS×(G)).
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4. Bounds on the Cost of Stability
Consider an arbitrary game G = 〈N, v〉 with an empty core. We have observed that G
can be stabilized by paying the maximum possible coalitional value to each agent, i.e.,
CoS+(G) ≤ n ·maxS⊆N v(S)− v(N). For monotone games we have maxS⊆N v(S) = v(N),
so this bound can be simplified to CoS+(G) ≤ (n− 1)v(N), or, equivalently, CoS×(G) ≤ n.
In fact, this bound is tight, as illustrated by the (simple, anonymous) game G′ given by
v′(S) = 1 for all S 6= ∅: Clearly, in this game any payoff vector that offers some agent
less than 1 will not be stable, whereas setting pi = 1 for all i ∈ N ensures stability. We
summarize these observations as follows.
Observation 5 Let G = 〈N, v〉 be a monotone TU game. Then CoS×(G) ≤ n and this
bound is tight, even if G is simple and anonymous.
We will now show how to refine this upper bound for specific subclasses of profit-sharing
games.
4.1 Superadditive Games
In superadditive games the grand coalition has the highest social welfare among all coalition
structures formed by disjoint coalitions, so its stability is particularly desirable. Yet, we will
see that ensuring stability may turn out to be quite costly even in this restricted setting.
A collection of subsets D is said to be proper if for every R, T ∈ D we have R ∩ T 6= ∅.
Shapley (1967) proved that when applying the Bondareva–Shapley theorem to superadditive
games, it suffices to consider balanced collections of weights whose associated balanced
collections of subsets are proper (see Theorem 3 therein). Consequently, there is a solution
B to G such that D(B) is a proper collection of subsets, which can be stated as the following
result:2
Lemma 6 (Shapley (1967), Theorem 3) Let G = 〈N, v〉 be a superadditive game. Then
there exists a solution B to G such that D(B) is a proper collection of subsets.
Lemma 6 enables us to prove a tight upper bound on the cost of stability in superadditive
games.
Theorem 7 Let G = 〈N, v〉 be a superadditive game. Then CoS×(G) ≤ √n, and this bound
is asymptotically tight even for simple games.
Proof. Consider a solution B = {δS}S∈2N to G such that D(B) is a proper collection of
subsets; its existence is ensured by Lemma 6. Since B is a solution to G and G is monotone,
we obtain
CoS×(G) =
1
v(N)
∑
S⊆N
δSv(S)
 ≤ ∑
S⊆N
δS .
To complete the proof, we will argue that
∑
S⊆N δS ≤
√
n.
2We thank an anonymous reviewer for helping us find this lemma in Shapley’s paper.
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Suppose first that there exists a set T ∈ D(B) with |T | ≤ √n. Every set S ∈ D(B)
intersects T . Thus we have∑
S⊆N
δS ≤
∑
i∈T
∑
S⊆N :i∈S
δS =
∑
i∈T
1 = |T | ≤ √n.
Now, suppose that |S| > √n for every S ∈ D(B). Then we have
√
n
∑
S⊆N
δS <
∑
S⊆N
|S|δS =
∑
S⊆N
∑
i∈S
δS =
∑
i∈N
∑
S⊆N :i∈S
δS =
∑
i∈N
1 = n,
which implies
∑
S⊆N δS ≤
√
n.
This bound is asymptotically tight: By Proposition 2, for each n0 > 0 there exists
an n ≥ n0 such that there is a (simple) superadditive game Gq with n players satisfying
CoS×(Gq) >
√
n− 1. q
For small values of n we can get a stronger bound on the cost of stability by consider-
ing all balanced collections of weights whose associated balanced collections of subsets are
proper. For example, for n = 3 the only such collection is δ12 =
1
2 , δ23 =
1
2 , δ13 =
1
2 and
thus CoS×(G) ≤ 32 <
√
3.
4.2 Anonymous Games
Recall that an anonymous game G = 〈N, v〉 can be specified by a list of n numbers v1, . . . , vn,
where vk = v({1, . . . , k}): We have v(S) = vk for every coalition S ⊆ N of size k. Using
this notation, we can simplify equation (3) for anonymous games.
Theorem 8 Let G = 〈N, v〉 be an anonymous game. Then
CoS×(G) =
n
vn
·max
k≤n
vk
k
.
Proof. Pick k∗ ∈ argmaxk≤n vk/k, and let p be the payoff vector given by pi = vk∗/k∗
for all i ∈ N . Clearly, p is stable: For every S ⊆ N , we have p(S) = |S|vk∗/k∗ ≥ v(S) by
our choice of k∗.
Now, suppose that there is a stable payoff vector q with q(N) < p(N). Renumber the
players so that q1 ≤ · · · ≤ qn and set S∗ = {1, . . . , k∗}. Clearly, we have q(S∗)/k∗ ≤ q(N)/n,
and hence
q(S∗) ≤ k
∗
n
q(N) <
k∗
n
p(N) = vk∗ ,
which means that q is not stable. Hence,
CoS×(G) =
p(N)
v(N)
=
n
vn
· vk∗
k∗
,
which completes the proof. q
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4.3 Superadditive and Anonymous Games
If we assume both superadditivity and anonymity, we can strengthen Theorem 7 consider-
ably. Note that an anonymous game 〈N, v〉 is superadditive if and only if for every pair of
positive integers k, ` such that k + ` ≤ n it holds that vk + v` ≤ vk+`.
Theorem 9 Let G = 〈N, v〉 be an anonymous superadditive game. Then CoS×(G) ≤
2− 2n+1 , and this bound is tight for odd values of n.
Proof. Fix an anonymous superadditive game G = 〈N, v〉 with |N | = n.
For every positive integer k ≥ (n+ 1)/2, we have
n
vn
· vk
k
≤ 2nvk
(n+ 1)vn
≤ 2n
n+ 1
.
Now, consider a positive integer k < (n+ 1)/2 and let q = bn/kc. Since k is integer, we
have q ≥ 2. By superadditivity we have vn ≥ qvk. Let α = n/k − q < 1. Then if n ≥ 3, we
have
n
vn
· vk
k
= (q + α)
vk
vn
≤ (q + α)1
q
= 1 +
α
q
<
3
2
≤ 2n
n+ 1
,
and if n = 2, we obtain k = 1 and (n/vn) · (vk/k) = 2v1/v2 ≤ 1 < 43 .
Thus, by Theorem 8, we obtain
CoS×(G) = max
k≤n
n
vn
· vk
k
≤ 2n
n+ 1
= 2− 2
n+ 1
.
To show that this bound is tight, for every odd n > 1 we define a simple game Gn =
〈N, v〉 with |N | = n by setting v(S) = 1 if |S| > n/2, and v(S) = 0 otherwise. In Gn
every two winning coalitions intersect. Thus for any two disjoint sets S, T , either both are
losing, in which case v(S ∪ T ) ≥ 0 = v(S) + v(T ); or exactly one is winning, in which
case v(S ∪ T ) ≥ 1 = v(S) + v(T ). Hence Gn is superadditive. Let k∗ = dn/2e. Then by
Theorem 8 we have
CoS×(Gn) ≥ n
vn
· vk∗
k∗
=
n
dn/2e =
2n
n+ 1
,
which completes the proof. q
We obtain similar results for cost-sharing games (Appendix A). All these results are
summarized in Table 1 on page 28.
4.4 Weighted Voting Games
We first note that the game used to establish the lower bound of n in Observation 5 is
equivalent to the weighted voting game [1, 1, 1, . . . , 1; 1]. So, without further constraints,
for weighted voting games we cannot improve over the trivial upper bound on the cost of
stability.
However, we can show that the multiplicative cost of stability of superadditive weighted
voting games is always less than two. This bound is essentially tight, even for anonymous
superadditive weighted voting games: The game used to prove the lower bound of 2− 2n+1
in Theorem 9 can be written as the anonymous weighted voting game [1, 1, . . . , 1; n+12 ].
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Theorem 10 Let G = 〈N, v〉 be a superadditive weighted voting game. Then CoS×(G) < 2.
Proof. Our first observation is that since G is a simple game, it is superadditive if and
only if every pair of winning coalitions has a nonempty intersection.
Recall that we assume that w(N) ≥ q. Suppose that there is an agent i∗ with weight
wi∗ ≥ q. In that case, by superadditivity i∗ must be a veto player, so the core of G is
nonempty and hence CoS×(G) = 1.
Otherwise, let S be a minimum-weight winning coalition in G. Pick an agent j ∈ S such
that wj ≤ wi for all i ∈ S, and set s = 1− w(S\{j})q . Note that s > 0 by our choice of S.
We define a payoff vector p by setting pj = s, pi =
wi
q for i ∈ N \ {j}. We claim that
p is stable. Indeed, consider a winning coalition R. If j /∈ R, then p(R) = w(R)q ≥ 1, so R
does not block p. Hence, suppose that j ∈ R. Note that w(R) ≥ w(S) by our choice of S.
Thus
p(R) = p(R \ {j}) + pj = w(R \ {j})
q
+ pj ≥ w(S \ {j})
q
+ s = 1.
It remains to bound the total payment:
p(N) = p(S \ {j}) + pj + p(N \ S) = w(S \ {j})
q
+ s+
w(N \ S)
q
= 1 +
w(N \ S)
q
< 1 + 1 = 2,
where the inequality holds because N \ S is a losing coalition. q
We conjecture that the worst-case cost of stability is obtained for weighted voting games
where all players have identical weights, i.e., that the lower bound of 2− 2n+1 is tight.
5. The Cost of Stability and the Least Core
In this section we explore the relationship between the cost of stability and several variants
of the least core. We start by defining the relevant stability concepts.
Strong and weak least core. Consider a TU game G = 〈N, v〉 and some ε ≥ 0. The
strong ε-core of G (Shapley & Shubik, 1966) is the set SCε(G) of all pre-imputations for G
such that no coalition can gain more than ε by deviating:
SCε(G) = {p ∈ I(G) | p(S) ≥ v(S)− ε for all S ⊆ N}.
Clearly, if ε is large enough, we have SCε(G) 6= ∅. The quantity εS(G) = inf{ε ≥ 0 |
SCε(G) 6= ∅} is called the value of the strong least core of G.3 The strong εS-core of G is
referred to as the strong least core of G, and is denoted by SLC(G).
In contrast, the weak ε-core of G (Shapley & Shubik, 1966) consists of pre-imputations
such that no coalition can deviate in a way that profits each deviator by at least ε:
WCε(G) = {p ∈ I(G) | p(S) ≥ v(S)− ε|S| for all S ⊆ N}.
3We remark that there are variants of this definition with and without the constraint ε ≥ 0; we impose
this constraint since we also require the additive cost of stability to be nonnegative.
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Just as for the strong least core, we define the value of the weak least core of G as εW(G) =
inf{ε ≥ 0 | WCε(G) 6= ∅}; the weak least core of G (denoted by WLC(G)) is its εW-core.
Clearly both SLC(G) and WLC(G) are nonempty.
Note that SCε(G) ⊆WCε(G) for any ε > 0 and, consequently, εW(G) ≤ εS(G).
Positive strong/weak least core. By definition, both weak and strong ε-core may
contain payoff vectors with negative entries. However, in many cases negative payoffs are
not acceptable. To capture such settings, we define the positive strong ε-core of G as
PSCε(G) = {p ∈ SCε(G) | pi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N}.
Similarly, the notions of the positive weak ε-core (denoted by PWCε(G)), the value of the
positive strong/weak least core (denoted by εPS and εPW, respectively) and the positive
strong/weak least core (denoted by PSLC(G) and PWLC(G), respectively), are defined by
adding the requirement that pi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N to the corresponding definitions above.
Clearly, we have PSCε(G) ⊆ SCε(G), PWCε(G) ⊆WCε(G) and εPS ≥ εS, εPW ≥ εW.
The impact of the requirement that pi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N is illustrated by the following
example.
Example 2 Consider a two-player game G = 〈N, v〉, where v({1}) = 2, v({2}) = 0, and
v({1, 2}) = 1. The pre-imputation (p1, p2) with p1 = 1.5, p2 = −.5 satisfies p(S) ≥ v(S)− .5
for each S ⊆ N and hence εW, εS ≤ .5. In fact, it is not hard to see that εW = εS = .5:
If v({1}) − p′1 < .5 and v({2}) − p′2 < .5, we get p′1 + p′2 > 1, so (p′1, p′2) cannot be a
pre-imputation for G. On the other hand, every pre-imputation (q1, q2) with q1, q2 ≥ 0 has
q1 ≤ 1 and hence q({1}) ≤ v({1})− 1, so εPW, εPS ≥ 1. Note that we have CoS×(G) = 1:
If (p1, p2) is a stable payoff vector for G then p1 ≥ 2, and (2, 0) is in the core of G(1).
Similarly to the additive cost of stability, the values of the (positive) strong least core and
the (positive) weak least core can be obtained as optimal values of certain linear programs.
We can think of all these notions as different measures of (in)stability. For instance, it is
clear that conditions εS(G) > 0, εW(G) > 0, εPS(G) > 0, εPW(G) > 0, and CoS
+(G) > 0
are all equivalent, as each of them holds if and only if the core of G is empty. The goal of this
section is to discuss the relationship between the (positive) weak least core, the (positive)
strong least core, and the cost of stability in more detail.
The extended core. Following Bejan and Go´mez (2009), we set
CoS+(p, G) = inf{∆ ≥ 0 | ∃p′ ≥ p such that p′ ∈ C(G(∆)) }
and define the extended core of a TU game G as
EC(G) = {p ∈ I(G) | CoS+(p, G) = CoS+(G)}.
We say that a payoff vector p′ is a stable extension of a pre-imputation p ∈ I(G) if p′ ∈ S(G)
and p′ ≥ p. Note that the set EC(G) can be viewed as the set of feasible solutions to a
linear program. Intuitively, EC(G) is the set of “the most stable” pre-imputations, i.e., pre-
imputations that require the lowest amount of subsidy to prevent coalitional deviations.
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5.1 The Weak Least Core
Bejan and Go´mez (2009) observe that the additive cost of stability and the value of the
weak least core are closely related and, moreover, every vector in WLC(G) can be stabilized
by adding εW to each agent’s payoff.
Proposition 11 (Bejan and Go´mez (2009)) Let G = 〈N, v〉 be a TU game. Then
1. CoS+(G) = nεW(G).
2. WLC(G) ⊆ EC(G).
However, Proposition 11 does not hold for the positive weak least core, as can be seen
from Example 2. Our next result relates the value of the positive weak least core and the
cost of stability for monotone games.
Proposition 12 Let G = 〈N, v〉 be a monotone TU game. Then 2εPW(G) ≤ CoS+(G) ≤
nεPW(G), and these bounds are tight.
Proof. The upper bound is immediate, since CoS+(G) = nεW(G) ≤ nεPW(G). To
see that it is tight, consider the game G = 〈N, v〉 such that v(S) = 1 for every nonempty
coalition S. We have CoS+(G) = n − 1. On the other hand, we have εPW(G) = n−1n :
Indeed, it is at most n−1n , because if we distribute the value of the grand coalition by paying
each agent 1n , then for each coalition of size s, s ≥ 1, the difference between its value and
the payment it receives is at most n−sn ≤ n−1n , and it is at least n−1n , because for every
payoff vector p with p(N) = v(N) we have pi ≤ 1n for some i ∈ N , but v({i}) = 1.
For the lower bound, let ∆ = CoS+(G) and consider a payoff vector q ∈ C(G(∆)); note
that qi ≥ v({i}) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N . Suppose first that there exist two players i and j, i 6= j,
such that qi ≥ ∆/2 and qj ≥ ∆/2. Consider the payoff vector q′ defined by
q′` =
{
q` if ` 6= i, j,
q` −∆/2 if ` = i or ` = j.
Clearly, q′ is a pre-imputation for G, all of its entries are nonnegative, and for every coalition
S ⊆ N we have q′(S) ≥ q(S)− (∆/2)|S| ≥ v(S)− (∆/2)|S|, so εPW(G) ≤ ∆/2.
Now, suppose that there is at most one player i such that qi ≥ ∆/2; assume without
loss of generality that qi < ∆/2 for i = 2, . . . , n and set S = {2, . . . , n}.
Observe that q1 ≤ v(N). Indeed, if q1 > v(N), the payoff vector q′ given by q′1 = v(N),
q′i = qi for i ∈ S satisfies q′(N) < q(N). Further, q′ is stable: We have q′(T ) = q(T ) ≥ v(T )
for every T ⊆ S and, since G is monotone, q′(T ) ≥ v(N) ≥ v(T ) for every T ⊆ N such that
1 ∈ T . This is a contradiction with our choice of q.
Thus we have q(S) = q(N) − q1 ≥ ∆. Consider an arbitrary pre-imputation q′′ for G
such that q′′1 = q1 and 0 ≤ q′′i ≤ qi for i ∈ S; note that q′′(S) = q(S) − ∆ ≥ 0. Since
qi < ∆/2 for all i ∈ S, we have qi − q′′i ≤ ∆/2 for all i ∈ N . Consequently, for every set
T ⊆ N we have q′′(T ) ≥ q(T )− (∆/2)|T |, which means that q′′ ∈ PWC∆/2(G).
The weighted voting game G = [1, 1, 0, 0, . . . , 0; 1] shows that this bound is tight: We
have CoS+(G) = 1 and εPW(G) =
1
2 (since any payoff vector for G allocates at most
1
2 to
one of the first two agents). q
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5.2 The Strong Least Core
In this section we derive upper and lower bounds on the ratio CoS+(G)/εS(G). Since
εW(G) ≤ εS(G), Proposition 11 immediately implies that CoS+(G) ≤ nεS(G). For general
TU games this bound is tight. To see this, consider the game G = 〈N, v〉 with v(S) = 1 for
all S 6= ∅: We have εS(G) = n−1n and CoS+(G) = n− 1. We will now explore whether this
bound can be improved if we place additional restrictions on the characteristic function.
In what follows, we use the following construction. Given a game G with an empty core,
we set ε = εS(G) and define a new game Gε = 〈N, vε〉, where vε(S) = max{0, v(S) − ε}
for all S ( N , and vε(N) = v(N). Intuitively, Gε is obtained by imposing the minimum
penalty on deviating coalitions that ensures stability, just as G is obtained by providing the
minimum subsidy that ensures stability. We have C(Gε) = SLC(G).
We will now show that for superadditive games we can strengthen the upper bound on
the ratio CoS+(G)/εS(G) to
√
n.
Theorem 13 Let G = 〈N, v〉 be a superadditive game. Then CoS+(G) ≤ √n · εS(G), and
this bound is tight up to a small additive constant.
Proof. By Lemma 6 there exists a solution (δS)S∈2N to G such that every two sets S
and T with δS 6= 0 and δT 6= 0 have a nonempty intersection.
Since (δS)S∈2N is a balanced collection of weights, applying the Bondareva–Shapley
theorem to the game Gε (which has a nonempty core), we obtain∑
S⊆N
δS(v(S)− ε) ≤
∑
S(N
δS(v(S)− ) + v(N) ≤
∑
S⊆N
δSvε(S) ≤ vε(N) = v(N).
Together with the fact that
∑
S⊆N δS ≤
√
n (cf. the proof of Theorem 7), this implies
CoS+(G) =
∑
S⊆N
δSv(S)− v(N) ≤
∑
S⊆N
δSv(S)−
∑
S⊆N
δS(v(S)− ε)
= ε
∑
S⊆N
δS ≤
√
nε =
√
nεS(G),
which completes the proof of the upper bound.
To see that this bound is tight, consider the game Gq (see Proposition 2). Since Gq
is a simple game, we have εS(Gq) ≤ 1. Moreover, consider the payoff vector p given by
pi = 1/n for all i ∈ N . If S is a winning coalition in Gq, then |S| ≥ q + 1 and thus
p(S) ≥ (q+ 1)/n ≥ 1/√n. Therefore, εS(Gq) ≤ 1−1/
√
n, and hence
√
n · εS(Gq) ≤
√
n−1.
On the other hand, we have seen that CoS×(Gq) >
√
n− 1. Since Gq is a simple game, this
implies
CoS+(Gq) = CoS
×(Gq)− 1 > (
√
n− 1)− 1 ≥ √n · εS(G)− 1,
which completes the proof. q
It is instructive to compare Theorem 7 with Theorem 13: For any superadditive TU
game G = 〈N, v〉, the former shows that CoS×(G) ≤ √n, while the latter can be rewritten
as CoS×(G) ≤ √n εS(G)v(N) + 1. For games where εS(G) is significantly smaller than v(N),
Theorem 13 is substantially stronger than Theorem 7.
Our next proposition establishes a lower bound on the ratio CoS+(G)/εS(G).
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Proposition 14 Let G = 〈N, v〉 be a TU game. Then CoS+(G) ≥ nn−1εS(G), and this
bound is tight.
Proof. Observe that WCε(G) ⊆ SC(n−1)ε(G) for any ε > 0. Indeed, let ε > 0, and
consider a pre-imputation p ∈ WCε(G). For every coalition S ( N we have p(S) ≥
v(S)−|S|ε ≥ v(S)−(n−1)ε, and hence p ∈ SC(n−1)ε(G). This means that εS ≤ (n−1)εW.
Now, by Proposition 11 we obtain CoS+(G) = nεW(G) ≥ nn−1εS(G).
To see that this bound is tight, consider the game G = 〈N, v〉, where v(S) = 1 if
|S| ≥ n− 1, and v(S) = 0 otherwise.
We have CoS+(G) = 1n−1 . Indeed, the payoff vector p given by pi =
1
n−1 for all i ∈ N
is stable and satisfies p(N) = 1 + 1n−1 . On the other hand, consider a payoff vector q
with q(N) < nn−1 and an agent i such that qi ≥ qj for all j ∈ N . Either qi < 1n−1 , in
which case for every coalition S, |S| = n − 1, we have q(S) ≤ |S|qi < 1, but v(S) = 1, or
q(N \ {i}) = q(N) − qi < 1, even though |N \ {i}| = n − 1, i.e., in either case q admits a
blocking coalition.
Further, we have εS(G) =
1
n : For the imputation p given by pi =
1
n for all i ∈ N we
have p(S) ≥ n−1n for every winning coalition S, and for every imputation q we have qi ≥ 1n
and hence v(N \ {i})− q(N \ {i}) ≥ 1n . q
For superadditive games, we can combine Proposition 11, Theorem 13, and Proposi-
tion 14 to relate the value of the strong least core and the value of the weak least core.
Corollary 15 Let G = 〈N, v〉 be a superadditive profit-sharing game. Then
√
nεW(G) ≤ εS(G) ≤ (n− 1)εW(G)
(superadditivity is not required for the second inequality).
For monotone games, we can strengthen Proposition 14, by showing that it extends to
the positive strong least core.
Theorem 16 Let G = 〈N, v〉 be a monotone profit-sharing game. Then CoS+(G) ≥
n
n−1εPS(G), and this bound is tight.
Proof. Let ∆ = CoS+(G). We will construct a pre-imputation p∗ ∈ PSCn−1
n
∆(G).
Set EC+(G) = EC(G) ∩ Rn+. First, we will argue that EC+(G) 6= ∅. To see this, pick
an arbitrary pre-imputation p ∈ EC(G), and let p be some stable extension of p. Note
that pi ≥ max{pi, 0} for all i ∈ N . Without loss of generality, assume that p1 ≤ · · · ≤ pn,
and let j be the smallest index such that
∑j
i=1 pi ≥ 0; note that p(N) = v(N) > 0, so j is
well-defined. If j = 1, we are done, since p ∈ Rn+. Otherwise, consider the pre-imputation
p′ given by p′i = 0 for i = 1, . . . , j − 1, p′j =
∑j
i=1 pi, and p
′
i = pi for i = j + 1, . . . , n. Note
that p′(N) = p(N). We have 0 ≤ p′j ≤ pj ≤ pj by our choice of j. Further, for i < j we
have p′i = 0 ≤ pi and for i > j we obtain 0 ≤ p′i = pi ≤ pi. Hence, p′ ∈ Rn+ and p is a stable
extension of p′, which means that p′ ∈ EC+(G).
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Now, for each p ∈ EC+(G) let Ep = {q | q ≥ p, q ∈ C(G(∆))} and define the following
linear program LP(p) with variables q1, . . . , qn, x1, . . . , xn:
max
∑
i∈N
xi
subject to: xi ≤ qi − pi
xi ≤ ∆/n
q ∈ Ep
Note that LP(p) is a linear program because Ep is defined by a set of linear constraints.
Moreover, if (q1, . . . , qn, x1, . . . , xn) is an optimal solution to LP(p) then we have xi =
min{qi−pi,∆/n} for all i ∈ N and hence the value of LP(p), which we will denote by `(p),
is equal to maxq∈Ep
∑
i∈N min{qi − pi,∆/n}.
Further, let LP∗ be the linear program with variables p1, . . . , pn, q1, . . . , qn, x1, . . . , xn
given by:
max
∑
i∈N
xi
subject to: xi ≤ qi − pi
xi ≤ ∆/n
p ∈ EC+(G)
q ∈ Ep
Again, LP∗ is a linear program because EC+(G) and Ep are defined by sets of linear
constraints. Let (p∗1, . . . , p∗n, q∗1, . . . , q∗n, x∗1, . . . , x∗n) be an optimal solution to LP
∗; we will
argue that p∗ = (p∗1, . . . , p∗n) is in PSCn−1
n
∆(G). Note that, by construction, p
∗ ∈ EC+(G)
and `(p∗) =
∑
i∈N min{q∗i − p∗i ,∆/n} ≥ `(p) for all p ∈ EC+(G). Let
N+ = {i ∈ N | q∗i − p∗i > ∆/n},
N0 = {i ∈ N | q∗i − p∗i = ∆/n},
N− = {i ∈ N | q∗i − p∗i < ∆/n}.
We claim that for every i ∈ N− it holds that p∗i = 0. Indeed, if N− = ∅, this claim is
trivially true, so suppose that N− 6= ∅ and, hence, N+ 6= ∅. Now suppose that there is an
agent i ∈ N− with p∗i > 0. Pick an agent j ∈ N+ and set
δ = min{p∗i , ∆/n− (q∗i − p∗i ), q∗j − p∗j −∆/n};
note that δ > 0. Construct a pre-imputation r by setting
rk =

p∗k − δ/2 if k = i,
p∗k + δ/2 if k = j,
p∗k if k ∈ N \ {i, j}.
We have
0 < q∗i − ri = q∗i − p∗i + δ/2 < ∆/n and q∗j − rj = q∗j − p∗j − δ/2 > ∆/n.
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Thus q∗ ∈ Er and
`(r) = max
q∈Er
∑
i∈N
min{qi − ri,∆/n} ≥
∑
i∈N
min{q∗i − ri,∆/n}
=
∑
i∈N
min{q∗i − p∗i ,∆/n}+ δ/2 = `(p∗) + δ/2,
a contradiction with our choice of p∗. Hence, p∗(N−) = 0.
Now, consider an arbitrary coalition S. If N+ ∪N0 ⊆ S, we have
p∗(S) = p∗(N) = v(N) ≥ v(S) > v(S)− n− 1
n
∆.
On the other hand, suppose that N+ ∪N0 6⊆ S. Consider some agent i ∈ (N+ ∪N0) \ S,
and let ∆i = q
∗
i − p∗i ; note that ∆i ≥ ∆/n. Since p∗ ∈ EC(G), we have q∗(N) = p∗(N) + ∆
and q∗(S) ≤ p∗(S) + ∆−∆i ≤ p∗(S) + n−1n ∆, so
p∗(S) ≥ q∗(S)− n− 1
n
∆ ≥ v(S)− n− 1
n
∆.
Thus p∗ ∈ SCn−1
n
∆(G), and since p
∗ is also in Rn+, we obtain p∗ ∈ PSCn−1
n
∆(G). Conse-
quently, εPS ≤ n−1n ∆, or, equivalently, ∆ = CoS+(G) ≥ nn−1εPS.
Tightness follows immediately from Proposition 14. q
We emphasize that monotonicity is a necessary condition both in Proposition 12 and in
Theorem 16, as illustrated by the following example.
Example 3 Consider a three player-game G = 〈N, v〉, where v({1}) = 100, v({2}) =
v({3}) = 0, v({2, 3}) = 1, and v(S) = v(S \ {1}) for every coalition S with 1 ∈ S, S 6= {1};
by construction, this game is not monotone. We have v(N) = 1 and CoS+(G) = 100: If
p is a stable payoff vector for G, we have p1 ≥ 100 and p2 + p3 ≥ 1, so p(N) ≥ 101,
and, conversely, (100, 1, 0) is a stable payoff vector for G. On the other hand, if q is a
pre-imputation for G and qi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N then q1 ≤ 1 and hence v({1}) − q1 ≥ 99
and therefore εPW(G) ≥ 99 and εPS(G) ≥ 99. In particular, we have neither εPW(G) ≤
1
2CoS
+(G) nor εPW(G) ≤ n−1n CoS+(G).
6. Computing the Cost of Stability: The Case of Weighted Voting Games
Our next goal is to understand the complexity of computing the cost of stability, either
exactly or approximately. However, here we face the usual difficulty associated with the
complexity-theoretic analysis of cooperative games: We are interested in algorithms whose
running time is polynomial in the number of players, yet the generic representation of an
n-player game is given by 2n − 1 numbers. There are two standard routes that can be
used to circumvent this issue (Chalkiadakis et al., 2011): One option is to assume that
the game in question admits a compact encoding, i.e., there is an “oracle” that, given
a coalition, computes its value in polynomial time, and another option is to focus on a
specific succinctly representable class of cooperative games. In this section we explore both
of these routes, using the class of weighted voting games as our case study for the second
approach. We hope that the insights offered by our analysis of weighted voting games and
the techniques we develop provide useful intuition for other classes of cooperative games.
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6.1 General Observations
The linear program LPG discussed in Section 3.2 provides a way of computing CoS
+(G)
for any coalitional game G. However, this linear program contains exponentially many
constraints (one for each subset of N). Therefore, representing it explicitly and then solving
it directly would be too time-consuming for most games.4 Thus, in what follows, we restrict
our attention to games with compactly representable characteristic functions.
Specifically, we consider games that can be described by polynomial-size boolean cir-
cuits (see the book by Chalkiadakis et al. (2011) for details), where the size of a circuit is
the number of its gates. Formally, we say that a class G of games has a compact circuit
representation if there exists a polynomial p such that for every G ∈ G, G = 〈N, v〉, |N | = n,
there exists a circuit C of size p(n) with n binary inputs that on input (b1, . . . , bn) outputs
v(C), where C = {i ∈ N | bi = 1}.
Unfortunately, it turns out that having a compact circuit representation does not guaran-
tee efficient computability of CoS+(G). Indeed, weighted voting games with integer weights
have such a representation (again, see the book by Chalkiadakis et al. (2011) for details).
However, in the next section we will show that computing CoS+(G) for such games is com-
putationally intractable (Theorem 18). We can, however, provide a sufficient condition for
CoS+(G) to be efficiently computable. To do so, we will first formally state the relevant
computational problems.
Super-Imputation-Stability
Given: A coalitional game G (compactly represented by a circuit), a supplemental pay-
ment ∆, and an imputation p = (p1, . . . , pn) in the adjusted game G(∆).
Question: Is it true that p ∈ C(G(∆))?
Cost-of-Stability
Given: A coalitional game G (compactly represented by a circuit) and a parameter ∆.
Question: Is it true that CoS+(G) ≤ ∆, i.e., that C(G(∆)) 6= ∅?
Consider first Super-Imputation-Stability. Fix a game G = 〈N, v〉. Given a super-
imputation p for G, let d(G,p) = maxC⊆N (v(C) − p(C)) be the maximum deficit of a
coalition under p. Clearly, p is stable if and only if d(G,p) ≤ 0. Thus a polynomial-
time algorithm for computing d(G,p) can be converted into a polynomial-time algorithm
for Super-Imputation-Stability. Further, we can decide Cost-of-Stability via solv-
ing LPG by the ellipsoid method. The ellipsoid method runs in polynomial time given a
polynomial-time separation oracle, i.e., a procedure that takes as input a candidate feasible
solution, checks whether it is indeed feasible, and if this is not the case, returns a violated
constraint. Now, given a vector p and a parameter ∆, we can easily check if they satisfy the
constraints of LPG that check whether p is an imputation for G(∆). To verify the stability
constraints (i.e., p(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N), we need to check if p is in the core of G(∆).
As argued above, this can be done by checking whether d(G,p) ≤ 0. We summarize these
results as follows.
4A framework to deal with succinctly specified linear programs, i.e., linear programs with exponentially
many constraints represented in polynomial space, has recently been proposed and analyzed by Greco,
Malizia, Palopoli, and Scarcello (2014).
18
Bounds on the Cost of Stabilizing a Cooperative Game
Theorem 17 Consider a class of coalitional games G with a compact circuit representation.
If there is an algorithm that for any G ∈ G, G = 〈N, v〉, |N | = n, and for any super-
imputation p for G computes d(G,p) in time poly(n, |p|), where |p| is the number of bits
in the binary representation of p, then for any G ∈ G the problems Super-Imputation-
Stability and Cost-of-Stability are polynomial-time solvable.
We mention in passing that for games with polynomial-time computable characteristic
functions both problems are in coNP. For Super-Imputation-Stability, membership
is trivial; for Cost-of-Stability, it follows from the fact that the game G(∆) has a
polynomial-time computable characteristic function as long as G does, and hence we can
apply the results of Greco, Malizia, Palopoli, and Scarcello (2011b) (see the proof of Theo-
rem 18 for details).
6.2 Weighted Voting Games: Hardness Results
In this section, we establish the computational hardness of the problems defined above
for weighted voting games. In what follows, unless specified otherwise, we assume that all
weights and the threshold are integers given in binary, whereas all other numeric parameters,
such as the supplemental payment ∆ and the entries of the payoff vector p, are rationals
given in binary. Further, given a weighted voting game [w1, . . . , wn; q], we set wmax =
max{w1, . . . , wn}. Standard results on linear threshold functions (Muroga, 1971) imply
that weighted voting games with integer weights have a compact circuit representation.
Thus we can define the computational problems Super-Imputation-Stability-WVG and
Cost-of-Stability-WVG by specializing the problems Super-Imputation-Stability
and Cost-of-Stability to weighted voting games. Both of the resulting problems turn
out to be computationally hard.
Theorem 18 Super-Imputation-Stability-WVG and Cost-of-Stability-WVG are
both coNP-complete.
Proof. Both of our reductions are from Partition, a well-known NP-complete prob-
lem (Garey & Johnson, 1979), which is defined as follows: Given a list A = (a1, . . . , an)
of nonnegative integers such that
∑n
i=1 ai = 2K, decide whether there is a sublist A
′ of A
such that
∑
ai∈A′ ai = K.
We first show that Cost-of-Stability-WVG is coNP-hard. Given an instance A =
(a1, . . . , an) ofPartition, we construct a weighted voting gameG by settingN = {1, . . . , n},
wi = ai for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and q = K. Set ∆ = K−1K+1 . We claim that (G,∆) is a yes-
instance of Cost-of-Stability-WVG if and only if A is a no-instance of Partition.
Indeed, suppose that A is a yes-instance of Partition, and let A′ be the corresponding
sublist. Set N ′ = {i | ai ∈ A′} and N ′′ = N \ N ′. Suppose for the sake of contradiction
that G(∆) has a nonempty core, and let p be an imputation in the core of G(∆). We have
p(N) = 2KK+1 < 2, and hence either p(N
′) < 1 or p(N ′′) < 1 (or both). On the other hand,
since
∑
i∈N ′ ai = K, we have w(N
′) = w(N ′′) = K = q, i.e., at least one of the coalitions
N ′ and N ′′ is blocking, a contradiction.
On the other hand, suppose that A is a no-instance of Partition, and consider a vector
p∗ = (p∗1, . . . , p∗n), where p∗i =
wi
K+1 . We have p
∗(N) = 2KK+1 , and hence p
∗(N)−v(N) = K−1K+1 .
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That is, p∗ is an imputation for G(∆). We now show that p∗ is in the core of G(∆) (and
thus that G(∆) has a nonempty core). Indeed, consider any coalition C ⊂ N such that
v(C) = 1. We have w(C) ≥ q. Moreover, as A is a no-instance of Partition, there is no
coalition C ⊂ N whose weight is exactly q, so we have w(C) ≥ q+1 = K+1. Thus we have
p∗(C) = w(C)K+1 ≥ 1. Hence, C is not a blocking coalition for p∗, and therefore p∗ ∈ C(G(∆)).
We can use the same construction to show that Super-Imputation-Stability-WVG
is coNP-hard. Indeed, considerG, ∆ = K−1K+1 , and the payoff vector p
∗ defined in the previous
paragraph. It follows from our proof that p∗ is in the core of G(∆) if and only if A is a
no-instance of Partition. Moreover, Super-Imputation-Stability-WVG is clearly in
coNP: To verify that a given super-imputation p is unstable, it suffices to guess a coalition
C and check that it is winning, i.e., w(C) ≥ q, but p(C) < 1. Finally, to see that Cost-of-
Stability-WVG is in coNP, observe that this problem is equivalent to deciding whether
the corresponding game G(∆) has a nonempty core. Furthermore, it is easy to see that
G(∆) has a polynomial-time compact representation in the sense of Greco et al. (2011b),
Section 3. Thus Theorem 6.8 in the work of Greco et al. (2011b) implies that deciding
whether the core of G(∆) is nonempty is in coNP. Hence, Cost-of-Stability-WVG is
also in coNP. q
The reductions in the proof of Theorem 18 are from Partition. Consequently, our
hardness results depend in an essential way on the weights being given in binary. Thus
it is natural to ask what happens if the agents’ weights are polynomially bounded (or
given in unary). It turns out that in this case the results of Section 6.1 imply that Super-
Imputation-Stability-WVG and Cost-of-Stability-WVG are in P, since for weighted
voting games with small weights one can compute d(G,p) in polynomial time.
Theorem 19 Super-Imputation-Stability-WVG and Cost-of-Stability-WVG are
in P when the agents’ weights are polynomially bounded (or given in unary).
Proof. As argued in Section 6.1, it suffices to show that, given a weighted voting game
G = [w; q] and a super-imputation p forG, we can compute d(G,p) in time poly(n,wmax, |p|),
where |p| denotes the number of bits in the binary representation of p.
For any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and any w, 1 ≤ w ≤ w(N), let
Xi,w = min{p(C) | C ⊆ {1, . . . , i}, w(C) = w}.
We can compute the quantities Xi,w inductively as follows. For i = 1, we have Xi,w = p1 if
w = w1, and Xi,w = +∞ otherwise. Now, suppose that we have computed Xi′,w for each
i′, 1 ≤ i′ ≤ i. We can then compute Xi+1,w as Xi+1,w = min{Xi,w, pi +Xi,w−wi}. Observe
that p∗ = min{Xn,w | w ≥ q} is the minimum payment that a winning coalition in G can
receive under p. As pi ≥ 0 for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have d(G,p) = 1− p∗.
Clearly, the running time of this algorithm is polynomial in n, wmax, and |p|. Observe
that one can construct a similar algorithm that runs in polynomial time even if the weights
are large, as long as all entries of p are known to be multiples of 1M , where M is a positive
integer bounded by a polynomial function of n. q
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6.3 Approximating the Cost of Stability in Weighted Voting Games
For large weights, the algorithms described at the end of the previous section may not
be practical. Thus the center may want to trade off its payment and computation time,
i.e., provide a slightly higher supplemental payment for which the corresponding stable
super-imputation can be computed efficiently. It turns out that this is indeed possible,
i.e., CoS+(G) can be efficiently approximated to an arbitrary degree of precision. We also
observe (Theorem 23) that simply paying each agent in proportion to her weight results in
a 2-approximation to the adjusted gains, i.e., to the quantity v(N) + CoS+(G).
Theorem 20 There exists an algorithm A(G, ε) that, given a weighted voting game G =
[w; q] in which the weights of all players are nonnegative integers given in binary and a
parameter ε > 0, outputs a value ∆ that satisfies CoS+(G) ≤ ∆ ≤ (1+ε)CoS+(G) and runs
in time poly(n, logwmax, 1/ε). That is, there exists a fully polynomial-time approximation
scheme (FPTAS) for computing CoS+(G) in weighted voting games.
Proof. We start by stating the classic characterization of the outcomes in the core of a
simple game (see, e.g., Theorem 3.2 in the book chapter by Elkind and Rothe (2015) and
the subsequent remarks).
Lemma 21 Let G = 〈N, v〉 be a simple coalitional game. If there are no veto agents in G,
then the core of G is empty. Otherwise, let N ′ = {i1, . . . , im} be the set of veto agents in
G. Then the core of G is the set of imputations that distribute all the gains among the veto
agents only, i.e., C(G) = {p ∈ I(G) | p(N ′) = 1, pi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N}.
Next, we prove a simple lemma that will be useful for the analysis of our algorithm.
Lemma 22 For every simple game G such that CoS+(G) 6= 0 we have CoS+(G) ≥ 1/n.
Proof. Consider a simple game G with CoS+(G) 6= 0; note that G does not have a veto
player. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that CoS+(G) = ∆ < 1/n, that is, the game
G(∆) has a nonempty core. Let p = (p1, . . . , pn) be an imputation in the core of G(∆). As
we have v′(N) = ∆ + 1 > 1, there must be at least one player i such that pi > 1/n. Hence,
p(N \{i}) < 1+∆−1/n < 1. Therefore, the coalition N \{i} satisfies v(N \{i}) = 1 (since
i is not a veto player), p(N \ {i}) < 1, and hence p is not stable, a contradiction. q
Our proof is inspired by the FPTAS for computing the value of the least core in weighted
voting games due to Elkind, Goldberg, Goldberg, and Wooldridge (2009).
We first give an additive fully polynomial-time approximation scheme for CoS+(G),
i.e., an algorithm A′(G, ε) that, given a weighted voting game G = [w1, . . . , wn; q] and
ε > 0, can compute a value ∆ satisfying CoS+(G) ≤ ∆ ≤ CoS+(G) + ε and runs in time
poly(n, logwmax, 1/ε). We will then show how to convert it into an FPTAS using Lemma 22.
Set X = 2d1/εe, and let ε′ = 1/X. We have ε/4 ≤ ε′ ≤ ε/2.
Consider the linear program LPG given in Section 3.2. Instead of solving LPG directly,
we consider a family of linear feasibility programs (LFP) (Li)i=1,...,nX , where the kth LFP
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Lk is given by
pi ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . , n,
p1 + · · ·+ pn ≤ 1 + ε′k,∑
i∈C
pi ≥ 1 for all C ⊆ N such that
∑
i∈C
wi ≥ q.
As ε′nX = n, it follows that at least one of these LFPs has a feasible solution. Now, let
k∗ be the smallest value of k for which Lk has a feasible solution. We have ε′(k∗ − 1) <
CoS+(G) ≤ ε′k∗, or, equivalently, CoS+(G) ≤ ε′k∗ < CoS+(G) + ε′. Hence, by computing
k∗ we can obtain an additive ε′-approximation to CoS+(G). Now, while it is not clear if we
could find k∗ in polynomial time, we will now show how to find a value k that is guaranteed
to be in the set {k∗, k∗ + 1}.
It is natural to approach this problem by trying to successively solve L1, . . . ,LnX . How-
ever, just as the linear program LPG, the LFP Lk has exponentially many constraints (one
for each winning coalition of G). Moreover, an implementation of the separation oracle for
Lk would involve solving Knapsack, which is an NP-hard problem when weights are given
in binary. Hence, we will now take a somewhat different approach. Namely, we will show
how to design an algorithm S that, given a candidate solution (p1, . . . , pn) for Lk, either
outputs a constraint that is violated by this solution or finds a feasible solution for Lk+1.
The running time of S(p1, . . . , pn) is poly(n, logwmax, 1/ε).
The algorithm S first checks if the candidate solution (p1, . . . , pn) satisfies the first n+1
constraints of the LFP. If no violated constraint is discovered at this step, it rounds up the
payoffs by setting
p′i = min
{
ε′t
n
∣∣∣ t ∈ N, ε′t
n
≥ pi
}
for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Note that for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have pi ≤ p′i ≤ pi + ε
′
n , and the rounded payoff p
′
i
can be represented as p′i =
ε′
n ti, where ti ∈ {0, . . . , nX}. We can now use a variant of the
dynamic programming algorithm used in the proof of Theorem 19 to decide whether there
is a subset of agents C that satisfies
∑
i∈C wi ≥ q and
∑
i∈C p
′
i < 1 (see the remark at the
end of that proof). If there is such a subset, the rounded vector (p′1, . . . , p′n) violates the
constraint that corresponds to C, and hence the original vector (p1, . . . , pn), which satisfies
pi ≤ p′i for all i ∈ N , violates it, too. Hence, S outputs the corresponding constraint and
stops. Otherwise, it follows that (p′1, . . . , p′n) satisfies all constraints of Lk that correspond
to the winning coalitions of G. Moreover, we have
n∑
i=1
p′i ≤
n∑
i=1
pi + n
ε′
n
≤ 1 + ε′k + ε′.
Hence, (p′1, . . . , p′n) is a feasible solution for Lk+1, so S outputs it and stops.
We are now ready to describe our algorithm A′(G, ε). It tries to solve L1,L2, . . . (in
this order). To solve Lk, it runs the ellipsoid algorithm on its input. Whenever the ellipsoid
algorithm makes a call to the separation oracle, A′ passes this request to S, which either
identifies a violated constraint, in which caseA′ continues simulating the ellipsoid algorithm,
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or outputs a feasible solution for Lk+1, in which case A′ stops and outputs ε′(k+ 1). If the
ellipsoid algorithm terminates and decides that the current LFP does not have a feasible
solution, A′ proceeds to the next LFP in its list. If the ellipsoid algorithm outputs a feasible
solution for Lk, A outputs ε′k.
Recall that we denote by k∗ the smallest value of k for which Lk has a feasible solution.
Clearly, A will correctly report that neither of L1, . . . ,Lk∗−2 has a feasible solution. When
solving Lk∗−1, it will either solve it correctly (i.e., report that it has no feasible solutions)
and move on to Lk∗ , or discover a feasible solution for Lk∗ . In the former case, A′ will either
solve Lk∗ correctly, i.e., find a feasible solution, or discover a feasible solution to Lk∗+1. In
either case, the output ε′k of our algorithm satisfies k ∈ {k∗, k∗ + 1}.
We have shown that CoS+(G) ≤ ε′k∗ ≤ CoS+(G)+ε′. Consequently, we have CoS+(G) ≤
ε′k ≤ ε′(k∗ + 1) ≤ CoS+(G) + 2ε′ ≤ CoS+(G) + ε. This proves that A′ is an additive fully
polynomial-time approximation scheme for the cost of stability.
We will now show how to convert A′ into an FPTAS A. Our algorithm A is given a
game G = [w; q] and a parameter ε. It first tests if CoS+(G) = 0 (equivalently, if G has a
nonempty core). By Lemma 21, this can be done by checking if G has a veto player, i.e.,
whether w(N \ {i}) < q for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
If CoS+(G) 6= 0, A runs A′ on input (G, ε/n). Let ∆ be the output of A′(G, ε/n);
we have CoS+(G) ≤ ∆ ≤ CoS+(G) + ε/n. On the other hand, by Lemma 22 we have
CoS+(G) ≥ 1/n, and therefore
CoS+(G) + ε/n ≤ CoS+(G) + εCoS+(G) = (1 + ε)CoS+(G).
Hence, ∆ satisfies CoS+(G) ≤ ∆ ≤ (1 + ε)CoS+(G), as required. q
We will now discuss the approximation guarantees of a simple procedure that pays each
agent in proportion to her weight.
Theorem 23 For every weighted voting game G = [w; q] with CoS+(G) = ∆, the super-
imputation p∗ given by p∗i = min
{
1, wiq
}
is stable. Moreover, for any super-imputation
p ∈ C(G(∆)) we have p∗(N) ≤ 2p(N).
Proof. First, it is easy to see that p∗ is stable, as we have p∗(C) ≥ min
{
1, w(C)q
}
.
Now, set ∆ = CoS+(G) and fix a super-imputation p in the core of G(∆). Let N ′ =
{i | wi ≥ q} and set k = |N ′|. Clearly, if i ∈ N ′, for any stable super-imputation p′ we
have p′i ≥ 1 = p∗i . On the other hand, it is clear that paying any agent more than 1 is
suboptimal, so pi = 1 for any i ∈ N ′.
Sort the agents in N \N ′ in the order of nonincreasing weight, and partition them into
sets C1, . . . , Cm in the following way:
j ← 0
while there are unallocated agents do
j ← j + 1
Add agents to Cj until w(Cj) ≥ q or until there are no more agents.
end while
if w(Cj) < q then
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m← j
else
m← j + 1, Cm = ∅
end if
Note that this procedure guarantees that w(Cm) < q, i.e., the last coalition Cm loses.
In particular, if m = 1 then w(C1) < q, and since w(N) ≥ q, this means that k ≥ 1 and
C1 = N \N ′. In this case, we have
p(N) ≥ k, p∗(N) = k +
∑
i∈C1
wi
q
< k +
q
q
= k + 1,
and hence p∗(N)/p(N) < (k + 1)/k ≤ 2. Therefore, throughout the remainder of the proof
we can assume that m > 1.
Set j′ = argmax1≤j≤mw(Cj), that is, j′ is the index of a maximum-weight coalition
among C1, . . . , Cm. Observe that since w(C1) ≥ q and w(Cm) < q, we have j′ 6= m. To
finish the proof, we consider two cases and show that p∗(N) ≤ 2p(N) in each case.
Case 1: w(Cj′) + w(Cm) ≤ 2q. For each j ≤ m − 1, we have w(Cj) ≥ q, and therefore
p(Cj) ≥ 1. Thus we have
p(N) ≥ k +
∑
j 6=m
p(Cj) ≥ k +m− 1.
On the other hand, we have w(Cj) ≤ 2q for all j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, so
p∗(N) = p∗(N ′) +
∑
j 6=j′,m
p∗(Cj) + p∗(Cj′) + p∗(Cm)
= k +
∑
j 6=j′,m
w(Cj)
q
+
w(Cj′) + w(Cm)
q
≤ k + 2(m− 2) + 2 ≤ 2(k +m− 1) ≤ 2p(N).
Case 2: w(Cj′) + w(Cm) > 2q. We begin by bounding p
∗(N), as it may be slightly larger
in this case:
p∗(N) = k +
∑
j 6=m
w(Cj)
q
+
w(Cm)
q
≤ k + (m− 1)2q + q
q
= k + 2m− 1.
Fortunately, we can provide a better lower bound for p(N). Let A1 be the set that
contains the last player in Cj′ only, and set A2 = Cj′ \ A1 and A3 = Cm. We have
w(A1) < q, since A1 has just one agent, and we have already removed all agents whose
weight is at least q. Furthermore, we have w(A2) < q, since we move on to the next
set as soon as a total weight of at least q is reached in the current set. On the other
hand, we have A = A1 ∪ A2 ∪ A3 = Cj′ ∪ Cm. As w(Cj′) + w(Cm) > 2q, we have
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w(A1) +w(A3) = w(A)−w(A2) ≥ 2q− q = q and w(A2) +w(A3) = w(A)−w(A1) ≥
2q − q = q.
Therefore, we have p(A1 ∪ A2) ≥ 1, p(A1 ∪ A3) ≥ 1, p(A2 ∪ A3) ≥ 1, and hence
p(A1 ∪A2 ∪A3) ≥ 3/2. Thus we have
p(N) =
∑
i∈N ′
pi +
∑
j 6=j′,m
p(Cj) + p(Cj′) + p(Cm)
≥ k + (m− 2) + p(Cj′ ∪ Cm)
= k +m− 2 + p(A1 ∪A2 ∪A3)
≥ k +m− 2 + 3
2
=
2k + 2m− 1
2
≥ p
∗(N)
2
.
This completes the proof of Theorem 23. q
7. Related Work
The term “cost of stability” was introduced in a preliminary version of this work by Bachrach
et al. (2009b, 2009a), who proved several bounds on the additive cost of stability, and
presented computational complexity results for problems related to the cost of stability in
some classes of games. Two other papers, by subsets of the current set of authors (Meir
et al., 2010, 2011), studied the cost of stability in cost-sharing games and games with
restricted cooperation, as well as the relationship between the cost of stability and the least
core. The current paper covers all of these previous results as well as improved bounds and
a number of results that do not appear in the earlier papers.
7.1 Recent Research on Subsidies and the Cost of Stability
Since the first of these papers has been published, several groups of researchers studied
the cost of stability, focusing mainly on computational questions. Resnick, Bachrach, Meir,
and Rosenschein (2009) examined the cost of stability in threshold network flow games, a
family of simple games played on flow networks where a coalition of edges wins if it can
guarantee a sufficient flow from the source to the sink. Aziz, Brandt, and Harrenstein
(2010) studied the complexity of computing the cost of stability and the least core in a
variety of coalitional games, comparing games with thresholds (such as threshold network
flow games and weighted voting games) to their variants without a threshold. Aadithya,
Michalak, and Jennings (2011) showed that for coalitional games represented by algebraic
decision diagrams the cost of stability can be computed in polynomial time. Greco, Malizia,
Palopoli, and Scarcello (2011a) proved bounds on the complexity of computing the cost of
stability, for games with and without coalition structures. Persien, Rey, and Rothe (2016)
studied the cost of stability in relation to the least core in path-disruption games.
Meir, Zick, Elkind, and Rosenschein (2013) studied bounds on the cost of stability
when cooperation is restricted by a network of social connections in the model of Myerson
(1977), rather than by the size of the coalition. These bounds where further improved by
Bousquet, Li, and Vetta (2015). Chalkiadakis, Greco, and Markakis (2016) studied various
computational questions related to core stability on such network-restricted games, and in
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particular showed that computing the cost of stability is easy for some networks (cycles,
trees) but computationally hard for other networks. The exact complexity class also depends
on whether the game is superadditive.
A model for subsidies in coalitional games was independently suggested by Bejan and
Go´mez (2009), who focused (as we do in Section 5) on the relationship between subsidies
and other solution concepts. However, in their work the additional payment required to
stabilize a game is collected from the participating agents by means of a specific taxation
system, rather than injected into the game by an external authority, whereas we do not
assume any form of taxation. The taxation approach was extended by Zick, Polukarov, and
Jennings (2013), who also studied the connections between taxes and the cost of stability.
The relation between the cost of stability and another property of TU games (which aims
to measure how far a game is from being a weighted voting game) was studied by Freixas
and Kurz (2014).
7.2 Approximate Core
Several other researchers studied subsidies and other incentive issues in cost-sharing games
using different terminology. Specifically, Deng, Ibaraki, and Nagamochi (1999) show that a
coalitional game whose characteristic function is given by an integer program of a certain
form has a nonempty core if and only if the linear relaxation of this problem has an integer
solution. Their argument can be used to relate the multiplicative cost of stability in such
games and the integrality gap of the respective program (see Appendix A). The connection
between the integrality gap and the multiplicative cost of stability is made by Goemans and
Skutella (2004) in the context of facility location games.
A number of other authors have studied the cost of stability in a variety of combinatorial
optimization games, sometimes adding other requirements on top of minimization of subsi-
dies. A common assumption is that players gain some private utility from participating in
the game; in contrast, our model assumes that participation is mandatory, or, equivalently,
that the utility derived from participation is sufficiently high to guarantee participation at
any cost. Specifically, Devanur, Mihail, and Vazirani (2005) suggested a mechanism that is
strategyproof and recovers at least a fraction of 1lnn+1 of the total cost in set cover games,
and a constant fraction (namely, 0.462) in metric facility location games. Our results in
Appendix A imply that for set cover games this bound is tight, even if the strategyproofness
requirement is dropped.
An application that has drawn much attention is routing in networks, which was initially
formulated as a minimum spanning tree (MST) game (Claus & Kleitman, 1973). In an MST
game the agents are nodes of a graph, and each edge is a connection that has a fixed price.
The cost of a coalition is the price of the cheapest tree that connects all participating nodes
to the source node. The multiplicative cost of stability in this model is always 1, as the core
of an MST is never empty (Granot & Huberman, 1981). However, there is a more realistic
variant of this game known as the Steiner tree game, where nodes are allowed to route
through nodes that are not part of their coalition. Megiddo (1978) showed that the core of
a Steiner tree game may be empty, and therefore its cost of stability is nontrivial. Jain and
Vazirani (2001) proposed a mechanism for the Steiner tree game with multiplicative cost of
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stability of 1/2, under the stronger requirements of group strategyproofness.5 Ko¨nemann,
Leonardi, Scha¨fer, and van Zwam (2008, 2005) put forward mechanisms for the more general
Steiner forest game that have the same cost of stability, and suggest that this bound is tight.
It is interesting to note that the value of the optimal Steiner tree (i.e., the value of the
grand coalition) can be written as an integer linear program whose integrality gap is lower-
bounded by 1/2 as well (Vazirani, 2003, Example 22.10, p. 206). However, in contrast to
set cover games, for Steiner tree games we do not know if the integrality gap is always equal
to the inverse of the multiplicative cost of stability, or if better cost-sharing mechanisms
are possible when the strategyproofness constraint is relaxed. In fact, a different line of
research by Skorin-Kapov (1995) suggested a cost-sharing mechanism for Steiner trees that
does not guarantee strategyproofness, and showed empirically that it allocates at least 92%
of the cost on all tested instances.
Other cost-sharing mechanisms have been suggested for many different games. For
example, Moulin and Shenker (2001) studied the tradeoff between efficiency and the cost
of stability in subadditive games; further results are provided by Pa´l and Tardos (2003)
and Immorlica, Mahdian, and Mirrokni (2005). Some of the proposed mechanisms impose
strong requirements such as group strategyproofness, in addition to stability. Therefore, it
is an interesting question whether tighter bounds on the cost of stability for specific families
of games can be derived once these requirements are relaxed.
7.3 Subsidies in Normal-Form Games
The idea of providing subsidies to ensure stability has also been explored in the context
of normal-form games. Monderer and Tennenholtz (2004) investigate the setting where
an interested party wishes to influence the behavior of agents in a game not under its
control. In spirit, their approach is close to the one we take here: The interested party
may commit to making nonnegative payments to the agents if certain strategy profiles are
selected. Payments are given to agents individually, but they are dependent on the strategies
selected by all agents. As in our work, it is assumed that the interested party wishes to
minimize its expenses. Determining the optimal monetary offers to be made in order to
implement a desired outcome is shown to be NP-hard in general, but becomes tractable
under certain constraints. Also, it is sometimes possible for the external party to stabilize
a particular outcome without paying anything, which is clearly impossible in our setting.
Another closely related paper is that by Buchbinder, Lewin-Eytan, Naor, and Orda
(2010), who study subsidies in a normal-form version of the set cover game. However, the
focus of this paper is on efficiency rather than stability, and the subsidy is financed by taxes
collected from the users.
8. Conclusions and Future Work
We have examined the possibility of stabilizing a coalitional game by offering the agents
additional payments in order to discourage them from deviating. We provided bounds on the
5More precisely, Jain and Vazirani (2001) demanded full cost recovery and relaxed stability constraints.
The bound on the cost of stability is achieved if we divide their proposed payments by 2.
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Table 1: The multiplicative cost of stability for various classes of TU games. The corre-
sponding theorem or proposition appears in brackets. All bounds are either exactly
or asymptotically tight.
CoS×(G) any super/sub-additive
all WVG anonymous
Profit-sharing (upper bound) n
√
n (Thm. 7) 2 (Thm. 10) 2nn+1 (Thm. 9)
Cost-sharing (lower bound) 0 1lnn+1 (Prop. 29) -
n
2(n−1) (Thm. 31)
cost of stability both for general games and under various restrictions on the characteristic
function, such as superadditivity and anonymity, and our results are summarized in Table 1.
It should be noted that our results naturally extend to the case where we drop the
superadditivity requirement, but allow agents to form coalition structures rather than the
grand coalition. By using the superadditive cover, as defined by Aumann and Dre´ze (1974)
(or the subadditive cover for cost-sharing games), we get the same tight bounds on the
multiplicative cost of stabilizing the optimal coalition structure.
We have also explored the relationship between the cost of stability, the (strong and
weak) least core, and its variants such as the positive least core (Table 2). Finally, we have
studied the complexity of computing the cost of stability in weighted voting games and have
obtained both hardness results and efficient approximation algorithms.
There are several lines of possible future research. First, it would be interesting to
study the cost of stability in other restricted classes of games, for example games defined
by limited MC-nets (Li & Conitzer, 2014; Lesca, Perny, & Yokoo, 2017), or games with a
bounded number of player types. For the latter, it has been shown that the nucleolus can
be computed in polynomial time, because, given the bounded number of different player
types, the linear program needed for nucleolus computation, which in general requires ex-
ponentially many constraints, can be replaced by a linear program with only polynomially
many constraints (Greco, Malizia, Scarcello, & Palopoli, 2012; Greco et al., 2014). It would
be interesting to verify whether this approach can be extended to the computation of the
cost of stability. Another direction is to explore how the cost of stability is affected by
additional constraints on the cost/profit-sharing mechanisms, such as truthfulness, fairness,
and efficiency. For example, we could require the core of the adjusted game to contain a
“fair” imputation (e.g., the Shapley imputation), rather than just be nonempty. Finally,
the notion of the cost of stability could be extended to games with nontransferable utility
and to partition function games, where subsidies may assume more complicated forms.
Appendix A. Cost-Sharing Games
We denote a cost-sharing game by G = 〈N, c〉. The definition of the cost of stability for cost-
sharing games is similar to the one for profit-sharing games: The additive cost of stability
specifies the minimum subsidy that keeps the grand coalition stable, and the multiplicative
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Table 2: The ratio CoS
+(G)
εX(G)
for a profit-sharing game G, where εX varies according to the
variant of the least core (weak/strong, with/without positive payoff requirement).
Results with (*) are due to Bejan and Go´mez (2009). All bounds are either
exactly or asymptotically tight. SA and M stand for the additional requirements
of superadditivity and monotonicity, respectively.
CoS+(G)/ε(G) WLC PWLC SLC PSLC
Upper bound n (*) ⇒ n √n (SA, Thm. 13) ⇒ √n (SA)
Lower bound n (*) 2 (M, Prop. 12) n−1n (Thm. 14)
n−1
n (M, Thm. 16)
cost of stability specifies the fraction of the cost of the grand coalition that the agents can
cover without subsidy (the cost recovery ratio):
CoS+(G) = inf {c(N)− p(N) | p(S) ≤ c(S) for all S ⊆ N} , (4)
CoS×(G) = sup
{
p(N)
c(N)
∣∣∣∣ p(S) ≤ c(S) for all S ⊆ N} . (5)
A.1 Cost-Profit Duality
There is a natural mapping between profit-sharing games and cost-sharing games that is
known to preserve core emptiness/nonemptiness (Potters & Sudho¨lter, 1999). Thus one
may wonder if we really need to derive bounds on the cost of stability for cost-sharing
games from scratch, rather than simply infer them from the bounds in Section 4. We
briefly describe this dual mapping (not to be confused with linear duality) and show that
the cost of stability of a game reveals almost no information on the cost of stability of its
dual.
The dual of a game G = 〈N, v〉 (where v is either value or cost) is denoted by G∗ =
〈N, v∗〉 where
v∗(S) =
{
v(S) if S = N
v(N)− v(N \ S) if S 6= N .
Clearly, the dual of G∗ is G again. Suppose that G is a profit-sharing game and G∗ is a
cost-sharing game (or vice versa). It is known that the core of G is empty if and only if the
core of G∗ is empty; Bilbao (2000) provides a simple proof (p. 4). Hence, CoS×(G) = 1 if
and only if CoS×(G∗) = 1. Also, G∗ is monotone if and only if G is. One might therefore
expect that there exists a function f such that CoS×(G) = f(CoS×(G∗)) for every cost-
sharing game G. Unfortunately, the following proposition shows that the cost of stability
of a game does not reveal much about the cost of stability of its dual (as long as the core
is known to be empty).
Proposition 24 For every positive integer n there are monotone anonymous cost-sharing
n-player games Ga and Gb with CoS
×(G∗a) = CoS
×(G∗b), CoS
×(Ga) > 12 , CoS
×(Gb) = 0.
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Proof. We will proceed by explicitly defining profit-sharing games G∗a and G∗b and then
computing their duals. For x ∈ {a, b} we set vx(N) = n and vx({i}) = n/2 for all i ∈ N .
For a coalition S, |S| 6= 0, 1, n, we set va(S) = n/2 and vb(S) = n. Then CoS×(G∗a) =
CoS×(G∗b) = n/2, since each agent has to be paid n/2 to cooperate.
In the dual cost-sharing game Ga, we have ca(N) = n and, moreover, ca(S) = n −
va(N \ S) = n − (n/2) = n/2 for S 6= ∅, N . Note that the payoff vector with pi = n2(n−1)
for each i ∈ N is stable: For each S ( N , we have p(S) = n2(n−1) |S| ≤ n2 = ca(S). Thus
CoS×(Ga) ≥ p(N)ca(N) = n2(n−1) > 12 .
In Gb, we have cb(N) = n, cb(S) = n/2 if |S| = n − 1, and cb(S) = 0 if |S| < n − 1.
In particular, cb({i}) = 0 for all singletons. Since each agent can get the service for free,
CoS×(Gb) = 0. q
Another approach to transform a cost-sharing game into a profit-sharing game is by
considering the cost-savings game associated with the given cost game (Young, 1985). For-
mally, given a cost-sharing game G = 〈N, c〉, we define the associated game G′ = 〈N, vc〉 by
setting
vc(S) =
∑
i∈S
c({i})− c(S) for all S ⊆ N.
Intuitively, the value of a coalition S in the game G′ is the cost savings that agents in S
realize by staying together. We note that G′ may fail to be a profit-sharing game, as it
may be the case that
∑
i∈S c({i}) < c(S) for some S ⊆ N ; however, if G is subadditive,
we have vc(S) ≥ 0 for all S ⊆ N . We will now show that the additive cost of stability of
a cost-sharing game is equal to the additive cost of stability of the associated cost-savings
game whenever the latter is well-defined.
Proposition 25 Consider a cost-sharing game G = 〈N, c〉 such that ∑i∈S c({i}) ≥ c(S)
for all S ⊆ N . Then CoS+(G) = CoS+(G′).
Proof. The assumption that
∑
i∈S c({i}) ≥ c(S) for all S ⊆ N ensures that G′ is a
profit-sharing game. Let ∆ = CoS+(G′). We will show that CoS+(G) ≤ ∆. Consider a
payoff vector p for G′ that satisfies p(N) = vc(N) + ∆, p(S) ≥ vc(S) for all S ⊆ N . Define
a payoff vector q for G by setting qi = c({i})− pi for i ∈ N . Note that for any S ⊆ N we
have
q(S) =
∑
i∈S
c({i})− p(S) ≤
∑
i∈S
c({i})− vc(S) = c(S)
and
q(N) =
∑
i∈N
c({i})− p(N) =
∑
i∈N
c({i})− vc(N)−∆ = c(N)−∆.
This establishes that CoS+(G) ≤ ∆. Conversely, suppose that CoS+(G) = ∆ and consider
a payoff vector q for G that satisfies q(N) = c(N) − ∆, q(S) ≤ c(S) for all S ⊆ N . Set
pi = c({i})− qi. Then for any S ⊆ N we have
p(S) =
∑
i∈S
c({i})− q(S) ≥
∑
i∈S
c({i})− c(S) = vc(S)
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and
p(N) =
∑
i∈N
c({i})− q(N) =
∑
i∈N
c({i})− c(N) + ∆ = vc(N) + ∆.
Hence, CoS+(G′) ≤ ∆. Thus, we have established that CoS+(G′) = CoS+(G). q
However, the following result demonstrates that it is difficult to relate the multiplicative
cost of stability of G to that of G′ (and hence we cannot use the mapping from G to G′ in
order to import our bounds for profit-sharing games to the cost-sharing setting).
Proposition 26 For each positive integer n there are anonymous subadditive cost-sharing
n-player games Ga and Gb with CoS
×(Ga) = CoS×(Gb) and CoS×(G′a) 6= CoS×(G′b).
Proof. We define three-player cost-sharing games Ga and Gb; the construction can be
easily extended to any number of players by adding dummy players. Both in Ga and in
Gb the cost of every coalition of size two is 10 and the cost of the grand coalition is 17.
In Ga the cost of every singleton coalition is 10, whereas in Gb it is 7. Note that both Ga
and Gb are subadditive, and by construction both of these games are anonymous. Further,
CoS×(Ga) = CoS×(Gb) = 1517 : (5, 5, 5) is a stable payoff vector for both games, and for
every stable payoff vector p we have p1 + p2 ≤ 10, p1 + p3 ≤ 10, p2 + p3 ≤ 10 and hence
p(N) ≤ 15.
Now, in G′a the value of the grand coalition is 13 and the value of every coalition of
size two is 10, whereas in G′b the value of the grand coalition is 4 and the value of every
coalition of size two is 4 as well; by Theorem 8 we have CoS×(G′a) =
3
13 · 102 = 1513 and
CoS×(G′b) =
3
4 · 42 = 32 . q
A.2 Cost-of-Stability Bounds for Cost-Sharing Games
An interesting special class of cost-sharing games is the class of set cover games (SCGs).
Briefly, an SCG is described by an instance of the set cover problem: The agents are
elements of the ground set, and the cost of a coalition S is the cost of a cheapest collection
of subsets that cover all elements of S. More formally, a set cover game is a cost-sharing
game given by a tuple 〈N,F , w〉, where N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of agents, F is a collection
of subsets of N that satisfies
⋃
F∈F F = N , and w : F → R+ is a mapping that assigns a
nonnegative weight to each set in F . The cost of a coalition S ⊆ N is given by
c(S) = min
{∑
F∈F ′
w(F )
∣∣∣∣∣ F ′ ⊆ F , S ⊆ ⋃
F∈F ′
F
}
.
Theorem 1 of Deng et al. (1999) can be adapted to show that the cost recovery ratio of
SCGs can be derived directly from the underlying set cover problem.
Theorem 27 (Deng et al. (1999)) Let G be an SCG. Then CoS×(G) = 1IG(G) , where
IG(G) is the integrality gap of G, i.e., the ratio between the values of the optimal integer
and fractional solutions of the set cover problem associated with G.
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The integrality gap of the set cover problem is well-studied in the literature: It is known
to be bounded from above by Hn =
∑n
i=1
1
i < lnn+ 1. Moreover, this bound is essentially
tight, even when the sets are nonweighted (Chva´tal, 1979; Slav´ık, 1997). We will now show
that any monotone subadditive cost-sharing game can be represented as an SCG.
Lemma 28 Set cover games are monotone and subadditive. Furthermore, every monotone
and subadditive cost-sharing game can be described as a set cover game.
Proof. Fix a set cover game G given by a tuple 〈N,F , w〉. Clearly, G is monotone.
Further, for every pair of subsets S, T ⊆ N we have S ∪ T ⊆ F∗(S) ∪ F∗(T ). Therefore,
c(S ∪ T ) ≤ c(S) + c(T ), i.e., G is subadditive.
Conversely, given a monotone subadditive cost-sharing game G = 〈N, c〉, we construct
a set cover game by setting F = 2N and w(F ) = c(F ) for every F ∈ F . We will now
argue that the resulting game G′ = 〈N, c′〉 is equivalent to G. Indeed, consider a set S
and its cheapest cover F∗(S). We have c′(S) = ∑F∈F∗(S) c(F ). Since G is monotone, we
can assume that the sets in F∗(S) are pairwise disjoint: If we have F1 ∩ F2 6= ∅ for some
F1, F2 ∈ F∗(S), we can replace F2 with F2 \F1 without increasing the overall cost. Now, set
F ′ = ∪F∈F∗(S)F . Subadditivity of G implies that c(F ′) ≤
∑
F∈F∗(S) c(F ) = c
′(S). Further,
since S is a subset of F ′, we have c(S) ≤ c(F ′) and hence c(S) ≤ c′(S). On the other hand,
{S} is a cover of S, so we have c′(S) ≤ c(S). Thus c′(S) = c(S). Since this holds for every
set S ⊆ N , the games G and G′ are equivalent. q
Thus we obtain the following bound as a corollary.
Proposition 29 Let G = 〈N, c〉 be a monotone subadditive cost-sharing game with |N | = n.
Then CoS×(G) ≥ 1lnn+1 and this bound is asymptotically tight.
A.3 Anonymous Cost-Sharing Games
Just as for profit-sharing games, an anonymous cost-sharing game G = 〈N, c〉 can be de-
scribed by a list of n numbers c1, . . . , cn, where ck = c({1, . . . , k}) for k = 1, . . . , n.
Theorem 30 Let G = 〈N, c〉 be an anonymous cost-sharing game. Then CoS×(G) =
n
cn
·mink≤n ckk .
Proof. Pick k∗ ∈ argmink≤n ck/k, and let p be a payoff vector given by pi = ck∗/k∗ for
all i ∈ N . Clearly, p is stable: For every S ⊆ N , we have p(S) = |S|ck∗/k∗ ≤ c(S) by our
choice of k∗.
Now, suppose that there is a stable payoff vector q with q(N) > p(N). Renumber the
players so that q1 ≥ · · · ≥ qn and set S∗ = {1, . . . , k∗}. Clearly, we have q(S∗)/k∗ ≥ q(N)/n,
and hence
q(S∗) ≥ k
∗
n
q(N) >
k∗
n
p(N) = ck∗ ,
which means that q is not stable. Hence,
CoS×(G) =
p(N)
c(N)
=
n
cn
· ck∗
k∗
,
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which completes the proof. q
Without further assumptions, the multiplicative cost of stability of an anonymous cost-
sharing game can still be as low as 0: Consider, for instance, the game G = 〈N, c〉 given
by c(N) = 1 and c(S) = 0 for every S ( N . However, if we assume both anonymity and
subadditivity, then the subsidy is always less than half the cost.
Theorem 31 Let G = 〈N, c〉 be an anonymous subadditive cost-sharing game. Then
CoS×(G) ≥ 12 + 12n−2 , and this bound is tight.
Proof. For n = 2 the theorem is trivially true, so assume n ≥ 3. Fix some k∗ ∈
argmin ck/k. If k
∗ = n, the theorem follows immediately from Theorem 30, so assume
k∗ ≤ n − 1. Let q = n/k∗. We have q ≥ n/(n− 1) > 1, and thus dqe ≥ 2. We will argue
that q/dqe ≥ n/(2n− 2). We consider the following cases:
• n ≥ 4, q > 2. Then q/ dqe ≥ q/(q + 1) > 2/3 ≥ n/(2n− 2).
• n = 3, q > 2. Then it has to be the case that k∗ = 1, so q = n = 3 and hence we
obtain q/ dqe = 3/3 > n/(2n− 2).
• n = 3, q ≤ 2. Then it has to be the case that k∗ = 2, so q = 3/2, dqe = 2, and
q/ dqe = 3/4, whereas n/(2n− 2) = 3/4.
We showed that in all cases q/dqe ≥ n/(2n− 2). Further, since G is subadditive, we
have cn ≤ dn/k∗e ck∗ . Combining this with Theorem 30, we obtain
CoS×(G) =
n
cn
· ck∗
k∗
≥ n
k∗
· 1⌈ n
k∗
⌉ = qdqe
≥ n
2n− 2 =
1
2
+
1
2n− 2 .
To see that this bound is tight, for each n ≥ 2 we define a game Gn = 〈N, c〉 with
|N | = n by setting c(N) = 2 and c(S) = 1 for every S ⊂ N with S 6= ∅, N . In this game,
we have k∗ = n− 1, so by Theorem 30 we obtain
CoS×(Gn) =
n
cn
· ck∗
k∗
=
n
2(n− 1) =
1
2
+
1
2n− 2 ,
which completes the proof. q
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